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Illiberal regimes in the perspective  






Illiberal regimes are generally defined as regimes in which 
neither democracy nor fundamental rights are granted, and in which 
rule of law is substantially disregarded. Constitutional democracies, 
conversely, are regimes in which these principles and institutions are 
both granted and interconnected. No further distinction, on the other 
hand, is drawn between the constitutional democracies which were 
instituted gradually through a process of internal development within 
a given nation’s form of government, and the more frequent instance 
of constitutional democracies which were instituted after the collapse 
of a former totalitarian state (namely, the typical instance of twentieth-
century illiberal regimes). 
It is also commonly acknowledged that several of the regimes to 
have emerged worldwide in recent decades are to be located at some 
intermediate point in the constitutional democracy/totalitarian state 
dichotomy. How these regimes should be classified theoretically and 
how they may stabilize are still matters to be assessed: rather than 
attempt a taxonomy, it is thus preferable to offer an account of their 
origins and of the problems raised by their emergence in the 
perspective of comparative constitutionalism. 
 
 
2. The totalitarian State as prototypical twentieth-century 
illiberal regime 
 
Differences between Nazi, Fascist, and Communist ideologies 
and practices notwithstanding, the illiberal regimes that took hold in 
the majority of European countries in the twentieth century marked a 
watershed in the practices of individual and collective experience. 
While the repression of dissent had been the primary concern of 
absolutist and authoritarian regimes, totalitarian regimes needed to 
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secure active consent from the people – not least because the prior 
introduction of universal suffrage had already involved large sectors of 
the population in the public sphere, qua electorate. Consent was 
certainly achieved through the institution of a police state and the 
creation of a single mass party (hierarchically organized and closely 
interwoven with the state bureaucracy); what also proved vital was the 
use of mass propaganda technologies, available to political power for 
the first time in history. 
As theorized by Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile, in a 
totalitarian system “everything is in the State and nothing that is either 
human or spiritual exists, or is valuable, outside the State”1. Ernst 
Cassirer was later to observe that even clever and cultivated men 
surrendered “the highest human privilege”, and all of them began to 
feel, to think and to speak in the same way, without realizing their 
own lives were manoeuvred by political rulers2. By managing to 
inform the thoughts of individual citizens, totalitarian regimes 
succeeded in making public and private reason coincide. The feature 
of totalitarian regimes some theorists describe as their ‘concreteness’ 
consisted in the abolition of the distance between political power and 
the realm of the individual, the aim of which was to transform people 
into slaves. 
At the Constituent Assemblies that convened after World War 
II there was a widespread sense that hitherto unknown evils had 
discredited the state; and at the same time, an account had to be 
provided for the failure of the previous liberal regimes to resist the 
totalitarian turn. Overall, a thorough re-examination of the 
relationship that had held between state and constitution since the 
French Revolution was felt to be in order. 
The 1789 total breach with the ancien régime, the so called 
“table rase”, rested on the assumption that the plans for a future of 
freedom and equality for all could be drawn by the volonté générale as 
expressed in parliament. The law was conceived as an abstraction, at a 
remove from the actual needs of the people and the rights of the 
individual. The principle of equality before the law itself only granted 
the equal treatment of citizens on formal grounds, while de facto 
                                                                                           
1 G. Gentile, Fascismo (dottrina del), in Enciclopedia Italiana, vol. XIV, 
Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana, 1932, 835. 
2 E. Cassirer, The Myth of the State , Yale University Press, 1946, 483. 
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laying the premises for discrimination. At the same time, the danger of 
a new form of absolutism (the “tyranny of the majority” denounced by 
Tocqueville) lay in the very principle of legitimacy parliament drew 
from the fact of representing the people. Finally, with the abolition of 
the corps intermédiaires (the system of associations and professional 
groups) which under the monarchy had held its absolutist pretensions 
in check, nothing remained between the state and the individual, the 
former directly exerting its authority over the latter through an 
increasingly centralized administration. Due to its abstractness, 
however, this design failed to meet the totalitarian launch of a ‘turn 
towards the concrete’, while at the same time exerting a strong 
influence on the rest of continental Europe. 
 
 
3. The post-totalitarian Constituent Assemblies 
 
The post-World War II Constituent Assemblies were thus 
confronted with the issue of reversing totalitarianism (particularly the 
blurring of the public/private divide, with the State interfering with 
the conscience of individuals) without reviving the ‘abstract’ version 
of sovereignty. 
It is for this reason that the new constitutional perspective 
prevents any subject, including the state, from determining the 
ultimate ends of the community, which are expressed as substantive 
principles enshrined in the constitution. Meanwhile, the state itself 
ceases to be  viewed as a monolithic entity; it is viewed, rather, as a set 
of public institutions whose constitutional legitimacy is relative to the 
respective functions of each, and made to descend from a pre-
determined hierarchy. 
This new version of constitutionalism aimed to overcome the 
atomistic conception of freedom that had characterized the post-1789 
era over large stretches of the European continent: emphasis was 
placed on the relational dimension of individual identity by 
guaranteeing freedom of association (which did not feature in the 
nineteenth-century charters) and promoting pluralism in the social, 
economic, cultural and religious spheres. Such pluralism, in turn, was 
intended as a corrective to a purely representative democracy and 
envisaged the direct involvement of the people at referenda and/or 
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through the election of representatives at the local level. In this 
regard, a federal or a regional state structure was established on the 
twofold assumption that citizens are more likely to be aware of, and 
take interest in issues debated at a local level than the general policies 
discussed in the national assemblies, and that such structure serves the 
end of breaking down public power along vertical lines, thus 
complementing the division of power effected by the separation of 
powers at the horizontal level. 
In order to foster a pluralistic version of democracy and prevent 
the formation of a monolithic power block, democratic practices were 
extended beyond electoral processes. First and foremost, democracy 
was compounded by the recognition of citizens’ fundamental rights, 
whose full application was deemed necessary to ensure that electoral 
choices were made self-consciously. In the sophisticated version of the 
rule of law instantiated by the introduction of constitutional review 
over legislation, the judiciary was made fully independent in order to 
safeguard the enjoyment of such rights. Accordingly, different 
legitimation procedures were provided for elected officials and courts 
respectively, although this paved the way for a progressive imbalance 
between the democratic and the liberal pillar of the system. 
 
 
4. Illiberal democracy 
 
Post-1945 European Constitutions are still in force. Inter alia, 
this has tempered political conflict vis-à-vis the turbulent experience 
of the past. The new European constitutional states thus joined the 
family already formed by the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Canada, which further grew with the accession of India, Japan, and 
Australia. Meanwhile, the Cold War created a division which 
extended beyond its military and economic aspects to a conflict of 
opposite Weltanschauungen. Hence, from a Western perspective, the 
divide between constitutional democracies and totalitarian States (or, 
in political terms, between “the free world” and Communism) which 
for a long time captured the essence of the liberal/illiberal regimes 
distinction. 
Following the assertion that constitutional democracy had 
become the predominant type among constitutional regimes, Carl J. 
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Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski further suggested that 
totalitarian dictatorships, their current counterparts, differed from 
earlier autocracies not just inasmuch as their ideology covered “all 
vital aspects of man’s existence”, but because they “could have arisen 
only within the context of mass democracy and modern technology”3. 
Although opposed, totalitarianism and constitutional democracy were 
thus viewed as common products of an irreversible process of 
worldwide modernization. 
The success of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, with its emphasis 
returning to the country’s religious tradition, should alone have 
demonstrated that generalized progress toward modernity was not to 
be taken for granted. What is more, the regime of the Ayatollahs, 
where religious bodies exert a tutelary role over elected officials, was 
in no way compatible with an exclusive constitutional 
democracy/totalitarianism dichotomy. 
Further problems with this dichotomy became evident as the 
Soviet Union collapsed, bringing the Cold War to an end. While 
purely totalitarian regimes virtually disappeared (as even China 
liberalized its economy), constitutional democracies developed only in 
South Africa and in a series of Latin American States – with some 
difficulty. The new scenario was characterized, rather, by a huge 
flourishing of non-totalitarian illiberal regimes. 
The formula ‘illiberal democracy’ was thus tentatively proposed 
to designate regimes which could be said to stand at some point 
between constitutional democracy and totalitarianism: although the 
number of democracies has increased to 118 out of the world’s 193 
States, “many countries are settling into a form of government that 
mixes a substantial degree of democracy with a substantial degree of 
illiberalism”, with the implication that “Illiberal democracies gain 
legitimacy, and thus strength, from the fact that they are reasonably 
democratic”4. 
It is important to note that constitutional democracies were 
founded and flourished on the understanding that free elections tie in 
with the rule of law and the safeguard of fundamental rights. 
                                                                                           
3 C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and 
Autocracy, Harvard University Press, 1956, 27. 
4 F. Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, in 76 Foreign Affairs (1997), 
22. 
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Conversely, what the illiberal democracy formula implies is that the 
holding of elections suffices to qualify a certain system as democratic. 
Outside the perimeter of what has traditionally been labelled as 
‘violation of civil liberties’ lie further threats to constitutional 
democracy. Phenomena such as the virtual monopoly of the media by 
governing parties through patronage deals or proxy arrangements, or 
the disparity of resources between incumbents and the opposition 
created by state/party/business ties are likely not to be framed as civil 
liberties violations (the way, e.g., the closing down of newspapers 
would). And yet such uses of political power constitute an 
infringement of citizens’ political rights, the exercise of which is 
necessary for free elections5. It is crucial to note that “the use of 
political power to gain access to other goods is a tyrannical use. Thus, 
an old description of tyranny is generalized: princes become tyrants, 
according to medieval writers, when they seize the property or invade 
the family of their subjects”6. 
On the other hand, the manipulation of democratic practices 
may give rise to the emergence of populist leaders even in countries 
where constitutional democracies were already established. While 
nominally democratic, in the actual exercise of power populist leaders 
have been observed to disregard (and sometimes interfere with) the 
rule of law and the separation of powers principle7. A greater cause 
for concern lies in the fact that an appeal to constitutional principles 
themselves is frequently made to justify such phenomena. For 
instance, the concentration of media power is justified on grounds of 
economic freedom (although it negatively affects freedom of 
information). Populist leaders, further, incline towards a 
misrepresentation of parliamentary procedures and of the 
independence of the judiciary on the strength of the argument that the 
will of the people is the ultimate source of legitimacy, casting them 
above other powers. 
                                                                                           
5 S. Levitsky and L. A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes 
After the Cold War, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 6. 
6 M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice. A Defense of Pluralism and Equality , Basic 
Books, 1993, 19. 
7 C. Pinelli, Populism and Illiberal Democracies: The Case of Hungary, in Z. 
Szente, F. Mandak and Z. Fejes (eds.), Challenges and Pitfalls in the Recent 
Hungarian Constitutional Development. Discussing the New Fundamental Law of 
Hungary , L’Harmattan, 2015, 211. 
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In the light of the above, it may be argued the ‘illiberal 
democracy’ formula is a misnomer, suggesting as it does that the 
regimes it designates are substantially democratic, although illiberal. 
They should, rather, be regarded as a type of illiberal regime that 
differs in certain respects from the totalitarian. 
An alternative definition, that of “competitive authoritarian 
regimes”, is predicated on the fact that the contest for power in these 
regimes is ostensibly democratic; yet, while the opposition parties may 
run for election, they are however severely handicapped by fraud, civil 
liberties violations, and the abuse of state and media resources8. While 
there are grounds for a distinction between competitive authoritarian 
regimes so understood and mere ‘façade democracies’, it can be 
difficult in practice to draw a line of demarcation between them, as 
the instance of Russia may prove9. 
At bottom, these definitions rest on the assumption that the 
Schumpeterian view of democracy as an electoral competition aimed 
at selecting governmental authorities also applies to constitutional 
democracies. However, as we have seen, there is much more to the 




5.  The Western pretension to export democracy and civilization 
 
The discussion so far has focussed on the constitutional and 
political organization of public life, though a further element needs to 
be taken into account. Counter to what had been envisaged as a global 
process of modernization, the 1979 Iranian Revolution was the first 
indication that a return to religious or cultural traditions was taking 
place among non-Western civilizations, alongside the rise of non-
totalitarian illiberal regimes. 
As globalization has brought civilizations at closer quarters than 
in the past, the question arises as to whether the latent conflict among 
different civilizations is founded on a principle of respective 
                                                                                           
8 S. Levitsky and L. A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, cit. 
9 L. Diamond, Facing up to the Democratic Recession, in 26.1 Journal of 
Democracy (2015), 144. 
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legitimacy or rather on the pretence to hegemony of one upon the 
others – as implied in the thesis that conflict opposing ‘the West’ to 
‘the Rest’ has supplanted ideological and other forms of conflict10. 
Diverging from the view that, in our times, “A country does not 
have to be deemed fit for democracy; rather, it has to become fit 
through democracy”11, certain Western States took action to 
propagate a standardized version of democracy essentially founded on 
the holding of free elections: the underlying assumption being that the 
proper development of whatever civilization would proceed from 
those premises. Such attempts were made, initially, by the IMF, the 
World Bank, the US, and the EU based on the practice of 
conditionality – namely the making of aid and co-operation 
agreements with recipient States conditional upon the meeting of 
certain requirements, including financial stability and democracy, with 
the end of ensuring the opening of new markets. Conditionality may 
thus be viewed as a practice for promoting democracy under a narrow 
definition, one which “underscores a reconceptualised form of a 
constitutional state consciously crafted to be weak in relation to the 
sway of global markets, while also sufficiently barricaded against the 
day-to-day influence of ordinary citizens and civil society. This is a 
state in which citizens’ control over elected officials is removed while 
accountability, transparency and public participation are 
undermined”12.  
In EU policy, similarly, the accession of Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEEC) to the EU was made conditional upon 
their adoption of provisions safeguarding human rights principles and 
democracy. The incremental manner in which the EU responded to 
CEEC demands contributed “to the construction of their role as 
supplicants and, more particularly, as apprentices”13. In parallel, the 
EU attitude towards applicant states came to be framed as “an 
                                                                                           
10 S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, in 72.3 Foreign Affairs 
(1993), 48. 
11 A. Sen, Democracy as universal value, in 10.3 Journal Of Democracy 
(1999), 4. 
12 N. L. Mahao, The Constitutional state in the developing world in the age of 
globalization, in  12.2 African Journals Online (2008),13. 
13 C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 
Routledge, 1999, 149. 
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invitation to join the club coupled with the tightening of the club 
membership rules, in order to ensure that no barbarians get inside”14. 
Beyond the rhetoric of the EU motto ‘United in diversity’, accession 
criteria revealed how applicant states were in fact being subjected to a 
standardized test of democracy. 
Further along the continuum of democratic enforcement, 
military intervention (whether in response to terrorist acts or as a 
means to maintain hegemonic control over certain regions) has been 
advertised as a mission to export democracy. The Constitution of 
Afghanistan is at once the clearest outcome of such a mission and 
manifest proof of its failure. Because it was super-imposed onto a 
communitarian domestic tradition, the Constitution alienated the 
people from the newly founded institutions and thus fuelled 
intractable conflicts15. 
Under different circumstances, the imposition of the 
Constitution in Iraq also failed in tempering the religious conflicts 
latent in the country, thus paving the way for their violent outburst. In 
the Iraqi case, then, ‘Constitution, and constitution-making, instead of 
becoming tools of crisis management, and symbols of future political 
stability and identity, have become instead sources of special 
grievance for the excluded, a significant part of the fuel for the fires of 
a civil war’16. 
The claim that Western efforts to propagate democracy lend 
support to religious fundamentalism need not necessarily validate 
Huntington’s thesis that democracy is an exclusive achievement of 
Western civilization. The rise of fundamentalism may instead signal 
the shortcomings of the Western ambition to enforce democracy as a 





                                                                                           
14 W. Sadurski, Charter and Enlargement , in 8 European Law Journal 
(2002),  343. 
15 C. Pinelli, State-Building and Constitution-Making. The Cases of Kosovo, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan, in XVI Diritto pubblico (2010), 299. 
16 A. Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making and Its Pathology in Iraq, in 
51 New York Law School Law Review (2006/07), 538. 
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6. Theocratic constitutionalism 
 
Islamic states are characterized by several different forms of 
regime, quite independently of reactions to the Western pretension to 
impose democracy from the outside. The range of forms of 
government goes from Saudi Arabia’s absolute theocracy (thus, a form 
of totalitarianism) to the Republic of Tunisia’s 2014 Constitution, 
which instituted a constitutional democracy while identifying Islam as 
the country’s official religion. In between these extremes lies a variety 
of diverse regimes, in all of which free elections are held: Morocco’s 
constitutional monarchy; Egypt’s military regime; Turkey’s 
presidential system; Pakistan’s parliamentary system; or the Iranian 
republic of the Ayatollahs. 
The criterion outlined in paragraph 4, above, for discriminating 
between liberal and illiberal regimes is insufficient to capture the 
reality of Islamic states, since it fails to bring into the equation the 
divine law (Shari’ah)/secular law relationship. At the same time, 
recognition of the importance of the religious element in 
understanding those polities does not necessarily imply that a category 
for ‘theocratic constitutionalism’ should be set apart as a distinct form 
of constitutionalism, as some believe. 
The notional category of theocratic constitutionalism is 
identified by the following attributes: “(1) adherence to some or all 
core elements of modern constitutionalism, including the formal 
distinction between political authority and religious authority, and the 
existence of some form of active judicial review; (2) the presence of a 
single religion or religious denomination that is formally endorsed by 
the state as the "state religion"; (3) the constitutional enshrining of the 
religion, its texts, directives, and interpretations as a or the main 
source of legislation and judicial interpretation of laws – essentially, 
laws may not infringe upon injunctions of the state-endorsed religion; 
and (4) a nexus of religious bodies and tribunals that not only carry 
symbolic weight, but that are also granted official jurisdictional status 
and operate in lieu of, or in an uneasy tandem with, a civil court 
system”17. 
                                                                                           
17 R. Hirschl, The Theocratic Challenge to Constitution Drafting in Post-
conflict States, in 49.4 William & Mary Law Review  (2008),1179. 
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With the exceptions of the Constitutions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, in which elements of modern constitutionalism were introduced 
(such as a federal structure, or a constitutional court), the 
constitutional organization of Islamic countries exhibits, rather, the 
features of nineteenth-century European statehood; first and foremost 
among these is a formal conception of the rule of law – a legacy from 
the colonial era. Each constitution makes different provisions for 
adjusting such features to the general principle of the hierarchical 
supremacy of religion, though this does not, in turn, necessarily 
qualify the state as a theocracy. Most importantly, adjustments of that 
sort are possible within a conceptual framework in which all 
individuals are seen to be subjected to an overarching objective order: 
such a notion is common to divine law (as in the instance of Islam) as 
it was to traditional legal positivism, whereas it is clearly at odds with 
the principles of modern constitutionalism. 
The rationale behind the institution of a separate category for 
theocratic constitutionalism may be sought in the assertion that it “is 
seeking to displace the post-1945 universalist constitutionalist system, 
based on the normative system presided over by the community of 
nations, with one in which the constitutions of states reflect the will of 
God as one or another faith communities understand that will and its 
earthly constitution, for example, through ulema or magisterium”18. 
If this were the issue at stake, the categorization of a theocratic 
constitutionalism would involve a paradigm shift affecting the entire 
domain of discourse on constitutionalism. Not just the post-1945 
system would be affected, but the separation between religion and 
state inaugurated with the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which lay the 
premises for the establishment of state sovereignty, and later of liberal 
regimes. Our present grounds for distinguishing between ulema and 
magisterium, and, most importantly, between caliphates and states 






                                                                                           
18 L. Catà Backer, Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New 
Global Legal Ordering,  in 16.1 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2009), 85. 
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7. Communitarian constitutionalism 
 
‘Communitarian constitutionalism’, finally, has enjoyed some 
popularity as a formula to describe such East Asian regimes as 
Malaysia and Singapore. These countries feature strong executives 
operating within a dominant party parliamentary system, as a 
reflection of a cultural background informed by the Confucian 
tradition and the Asian values school, in which the common good is 
valued higher than any notion of individual freedom. A trait these 
countries have in common with Islamic states is the emphasis placed 
on matters of identity and authority; on the other hand, they are also 
multiracial and religiously diverse, which means that internal balances 
are constantly shifting and have to be maintained through a 
continuous re-negotiation of consensus. In this regard, they also differ 
from liberal regimes: while these, it is contended, are structured 
according to principles based on the impersonal application of 
universal legal norms and the enjoyment of rights at the individual 
level, leading ‘to an asymmetric neglect of civic duties, responsibilities, 
and the common good which non-liberal communitarian polities 
prioritized’, in communitarian systems ‘The socially embedded rather 
than unencumbered self is the adopted vision where the community 
plays a role in forming personal identity and moral choice, with the 
state committed to equipping citizens to participate in self-rule’19. 
Once again, it is necessary to consider whether the differences 
between liberal and illiberal regimes are in fact as irreconcilable as 
might appear. In particular, the view of constitutional democracies as 
committed to a notion of ‘unencumbered self’ has to be abandoned. 
Counter to an atomistic conception of society, there are several 
instances of countries which subscribe to a pluralistic vision of 
democracy, combining open political competition with the granting of 
freedom of association and of cultural and social pluralism among 
citizens. Again, the interval between the orientation to strictly 
individual rights and to the participation of social groups in public 
                                                                                           
19 L.-A. Thio, Constitutionalism in Illiberal Polities, in M. Rosenfeld and A. 
Sajò (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law , OUP, 
2012, 133. 
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affairs may be regarded as a continuum along which diverse points of 
balance may be achieved. 
Liberal regimes nurture within themselves the potential for 
internal evolution. Though to a lesser extent, however, the same holds 
for non-totalitarian illiberal regimes. It is in this perspective that the 
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